CO129-502-7 China- general situation 4-3-1927 - 26-4-1927 — Page 72

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responsibility upon you, but you alone are in a position to decide in circumstances which change so rapidly whether evacuation is necessary or not.

I fully realise political and economic consequences of evacuation, but in the circumstances decision must be governed almost exclusively by the fact that having committed ourselves to the defence of Shanghai at any cost we have no forces available for the adequate defence single-handed of Peking and Tientsin. Forces we could contribute to an international contingent would for the same reason necessarily be small, and we should not consider it safe to contribute them unless the international contingent were in our view adequate for the purpose for which it was designed, whether for the defence of Tientsin alone or for that of Peking as well.

You will understand therefore that the policy of His Majesty's Government is not fully covered by either the second or the third of the alternatives set forth in the third paragraph of your telegram. I do not know where you can have gained the impression that His Majesty's Government had decided to stand independently if necessary on the three vital centres of Shanghai, Tien-tsin and Canton, for it has always been our view (see my telegrams Nos. 25 and 39) that the defence of Tien-tsin must devolve primarily upon Japan and it was our hope that if our decision conveyed to you in my No. 237 was clearly understood by your Japanese and American colleagues, their Governments might be induced to do their full share in the defence of these places and not depend upon us for an effort, which, in view of the large contribution we have made at Shanghai, it is neither reasonable to expect from us nor possible for us to make. On the other hand, we have not adopted as a deliberate policy the total abandonment of British interests in China or in what- ever part of China the Southern party holds. We desire British nationals to stay and British interests to be maintained in all parts of China where they may safely remain. If they are in danger and cannot be defended they must leave. We favour evacuation of British subjects from places up country or elsewhere where they are either in danger or cannot be defended if they should fall into danger. And we have decided that, with the means at our disposal, there is one place and one place only which we are in a position to defend at any cost, namely, Shanghai. We are on the other hand advised that we have not the force available to defend Tientsin also if it is heavily attacked and other Powers will not take their full share in the general schemes of defence. We have therefore no choice but to evacuate it if the lives of British subjects are in danger.

This does not, however, necessarily mean that we have decided to evacuate everything except Shanghai and still less that we are prepared to announce this as our declared policy. Our policy is to evacuate only if circumstances make that course

necessary.

I have now received your telegram No. 642 and note that you have now intimated to your foreign colleagues the views of His Majesty's Government as instructed in my telegram No. 237. Resolution of foreign commandants has now been carefully considered and I hope to give you my views very shortly.

*

Enclosure No. 3 to Appendix (A).

Draft to Tokyo, Washington. (Repeat Paris and Rome.)

Peking telegram No. 642.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking had already thought it his duty to warn His Majesty's Government that there is serious danger lest a situation should arise at Peking similar to that which developed in 1901. You will observe that the commandants at Tientsin take an equally grave view of the position, and demand that the international force at Tientsin-l'eking should be raised to the figure of 25,000.

His Majesty's Government have undertaken the main burden of the defence of the settlement at Shanghai. It is not reasonable to expect that they should in addition take an equal burden in the North, and they have instructed His Majesty's Minister that unless effective international co-operation can be secured he must in case of necessity evacuate both Peking and Tientsin. His Majesty's Government realize the serious consequences of such a decision for other nations as well as for us, and it is with the greatest reluctance that they have brought themselves to contemplate it as

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